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This paper proposes an approach to classifying and measuring the primary elements 
of private pension supervision and undertakes an evaluation using a representative set 
of countries. The analysis considers how supervision methods and style relate to the 
basic design of pension systems and the broader environment in which they operate. 
Supervisory systems are shown to include six main elements, with considerable 
variation among systems in the scope and intensity of activities within each element. 
The analysis concludes that there are discernible relationships between supervisory 
methods and the context in which they are applied.  The level of economic 
development, depth of capital markets, underlying legal framework presence of 
mandates, and number of funds supervised are found to be associated with depth and 
intensity of supervision activities.  These findings support the principle that the 
organization and management of private pension supervision is significantly derived 
from the context and environment in which these systems operate.  






Over the past two decades, privately managed pensions have expanded from the 
exclusive purview of the wealthiest nations and a handful of colonial legacies, to playing 
a central role in retirement income worldwide.  An explosion of private systems 
emanated from Latin American and Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990’s, as middle-
income countries in transition struggled to find alternatives to financially unsustainable 
public systems and to establish pensions with labor market dynamics and incentives 
structures compatible with current demographic realities.  Developing countries are 
increasingly attracted to private pensions because of their ability to provide a viable 
means to create high income replacement rates for the formal sector and higher earning 
workers, and by their potential to mobilize capital to facilitate financial market 
development and stimulate growth. 
The design and operation of the private pension systems are as varied as the settings and 
motivations behind them. All share extensive regulatory and supervisory systems that 
seek to establish and enforce a framework that enables them to function fairly and 
efficiently, and to provide a high level of security. Although there is a growing body of 
work on the theory and economics of private pension systems, this tends to be focused on 
the financial implications and consequences of these arrangements, rather than on 
understanding their operation and oversight. Very little consideration has been given to 
the way private systems are supervised and to the factors that determine relationships 
between the design of a private pension systems, the environment in which they operate 
and the manner in which supervision is most effectively undertaken. 
Private pension funds have now successfully been implemented in a wide range of 
settings and circumstances. The extent of variation observed in the structure and 
operation of supervisory programs throughout the world inevitably raises questions about 
optimal design and best practices.  Commonality of objectives suggests greater similarity 
in approaches than is evident in experience.  Despite this variation in organization and 
practice there is, at present, no compelling evidence of the inherent superiority of any one 
type or style of pension supervision. This suggests that differences in the organization 
and operation of pension supervision programs are substantially a function of the extent 
to which they are aligned with the environment in which they operate. An analytical 
framework that identifies the primary elements of private pension supervision and 
evaluates these in relation to factors that potentially explain differences in how they are 
implemented in various settings is therefore useful to understanding the nature of the 
supervisory process and in the design and initial implementation of private pension 
systems.   
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A Theoretical Framework  
 
The existing literature on supervision of banking and insurance provides a starting point 
to evaluate pension supervision and define a set of hypotheses to guide the analysis. This 
makes a clear distinction between regulation and supervision. Regulation is defined as the 
establishment of specific rules and standards, and supervision as the process of 
implementing the system and enforcing compliance with the rules.  The reasons and 
benefits of using such distinctions are discussed extensively in the   literature. (Llewellyn, 
1999).  
A first hypothesis that guides the analysis is that discernable patterns define and 
characterize several distinctive approaches or “styles” of supervision.  These patterns are 
generally differentiated by the degree to which the regulation and supervision are pro-
active and its’ overall depth and intensity. Previous evaluations of pension regulation and 
supervision distinguish between two primary “styles,” a typically Latin American pro-
active approach, and an older Anglo-American re-active model. (Demarco et all, 1998), 
(Rocha, Hinz, Gutierrez, 2000), and (Vittas, 1998). A key issue in the analysis is whether 
these represent distinctive modes of supervision or they simply define the ends of a 
continuum of possible approaches. 
Work on the development of financial systems by Franklin Allen and Steven Gale, points 
to a relationship between the stage of a country’s economic development and its ability to 
rely on market mechanisms for financial sector supervision. An underlying motivation for 
all financial supervision is to address the inability of market mechanisms to address 
moral hazard and agency problems. A second hypothesis is  that supervisory activities are 
a function of the country’s stage of economic development, that more developed 
economies are more readily able to rely on market mechanisms and institutions to enforce 
the integrity of financial intermediaries such as pension funds.  It is therefore anticipated 
that the degree of openness and a more re-active approach to supervision is strongly 
linked to levels of development. The same logic applies to countries where markets are 
open and many participants enter to provide advice or products to the consumers of 
pension services. In these markets, the intensity of the efforts of the supervisors typically 
face a capacity constraint and supervisors must rely on other methods to facilitate 
voluntary compliance with regulation.  
The debate on the link between the stage of economic development and the structure of 
financial systems is frequently connected in the literature with discussions about legal 
traditions and the typology of legal systems. Levine (1998, 1999) and (Levine et al 1999)  
trace linkages from legal origins to financial development and economic growth. 
Specifically, they find that legal origins account for cross-country differences in the 
financial development of bank and stock markets and explain international differences in 
long-run rates of economic growth, potentially relating legal systems and traditions to the 
organization and intensity of pension supervision. 
The importance of a strong “Rule of Law” and governance for financial system stability 
has been recognized and explored by various authors. A technique for the measurement   
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of the rule of law has been developed by Kaufmann and Kraay. (Kaufmann et all, 2003). 
A hypothesis derived from their work is that governance and strength of “rule of law” are 
important determinants of the degree to which countries can rely on the market or 
external parties to carry out supervisory activities.  
Another factor relevant to the approach to supervision is the degree to which participation 
in pension systems is mandated or voluntary. Mandated pension systems require a large 
number of typically unsophisticated members to engage in enforced savings through 
pension funds, usually with the underlying economic risk born by the participants. These 
types of arrangements can be expected to require higher levels of security and 
consequently a more pro-active, intense supervision.  
The working hypotheses may therefore be summarized as: 
1. There are consistent patterns and relationships that characterize areas of 
emphasis and the overall intensity of pension supervision. 
2. There is a relationship between the stage of a country’s economic development 
and the intensity of the pension supervisory activities.  
3. Countries with a large number of supervised entities cannot be comprehensive 
and must rely on other methods to facilitate voluntary compliance. 
4. The underlying type of legal systems and traditions is associated with the 
intensity of pension supervision.  
5. Governance and the strength of “Rule of Law” are important determinants of 
the degree to which countries can rely on the market to carry out pension 
supervisory activities.  
6. Mandatory pension systems require more pro-active, intense supervision.   
 
Primary Elements of Supervision 
  
Consideration of the factors that influence the design and operation of pension fund 
supervision requires the formulation of a framework to organize and classify the elements 
of these programs. This provides a framework for differentiating and evaluating the 
programs on the basis of variations in the way that the elements are implemented that 
enables a comparative analysis to discern potential explanatory factors. 
The first step in this process is to identify and describe a set of primary functional 
elements (or typology) common to supervision programs.  Values based on an assessment 
of the depth and intensity of activities within each category are then assigned to each 
category across the representative sample of countries to provide a basis for a 
comparative evaluation. 
The activities of pension supervisors can be considered in six primary categories: (1) 
licensing, (2) monitoring; (3) analysis; (4) intervention; and (5) correction and (6) 
communication. Each of these is briefly described below. 
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1. Licensing 
Licensing activities restrict and control entry to the pension market through procedural 
requirements and criteria. These are commonly applied to pension funds or the entities 
that are permitted to sponsor or operate them.  They can also be extended to individuals 
who perform important functions in the pension system, for example trustees, or to firms 
or individuals that are qualified to provide services, for example, to actuaries who 
evaluate the status of defined benefit plans. The modalities in which this function is 
exercised differ widely across different systems but in essence they all make use of a set 
of predetermined criteria to establish an entry barrier or select a limited number of 
entrants. 
Licensing is generally directed toward managing the risk of incompetent or unqualified 
entrants to the market or to insure against the results of negligent or risky behavior by 
imposing capital or bonding requirements. It may, however, also have the purpose of 
limiting competition or ensuring economies of scale in pension markets. Licensing can 
also be seen as a mechanism to ensure public confidence in the private pension system, 
by applying transparent standards and establishing security to warrantee the integrity of 
funds. 
Licensing is differentiated among pension systems by it’s restrictiveness, depth, and 
periodicity.  Some systems have virtually no entry barriers while others have very 
complex and strict standards applied by the supervisor.  Licensing can be incident to all 
participants before they enter the market, only to some participants, depending on their 
size or the structure of their assets, or to none of the participants. Also, in cases where 
licenses are issued, they can be issued only once (for the life of the supervised entity) or 





Monitoring activities collect information to enable the supervisor to track the status and 
actions of the pension funds within its jurisdiction.  Monitoring commonly takes the form 
of required submissions of information on a regular basis or periodic reports to the 
supervisor. It also includes a range of other reporting requirements or more active forms 
of information collection.  The common attribute is the provision of information that will 
either provide the basis for judgments or actions by the supervisor, or through its 
provision or disclosure make the activities of the pension funds more transparent.   
Potential recipients and users of monitoring include supervisors as well as the members 
of funds.   
Monitoring activities can be defined in terms of both the scope and content of the 
information that is collected as well as the mode of collection.  Common types of 
information collected include financial statements, schedules of transactions, information 
on individuals responsible for important aspects of fund operations (trustees, 
administrators, Boards of Directors), actuarial analyses and information on the sponsors 
of pension funds.   
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Monitoring is often a passive activity on the part of the supervisor in which information 
is required to be submitted by the relevant institutions or individuals.  It may also be a 
pro-active function in which the supervisor periodically goes on site to collect specific or 
supplementary information.  Supervisors may also monitor the media for information, 
have regular exchanges of information or consultations with other supervisors, and have 
regular programs of meetings with pension funds to collect information. An important 
form of monitoring is establishing venues for individuals or fund members to 
communicate with the supervisor and to request scrutiny of a particular fund or activity.  
A distinctive type of this approach are the so called “whistleblower” requirements of 
some systems, which assign responsibility to certain individuals or parties to report 
knowledge of improprieties to the supervisor.  Some monitoring systems also use 
independent third parties such as auditors or credit rating agencies to produce or verify 
information. 
Monitoring varies in terms of the type, scope, and depth of the information that 
supervisors seek to utilize, as well as the parties who provide the information and the 




Supervisors engage in a full range of activities to communicate with pension funds. These 
are essentially the complement to monitoring activities in which the flow of information 
is from the supervisor to the funds.  This can make it difficult to cleanly separate the two 
in many instances.  Supervisors may communicate with the funds through the provision 
of regular reports on the industry, by announcing their priorities and compliance strategy, 
or by publicizing compliance actions.  They may also engage in interactive 
communication by placing inspectors on site and engaging in daily communication, by 
meeting regularly with the funds to discuss issues of mutual interest or through more 
formal processes in which changes in the activities of the funds are suggested and issues 
resolved through negotiation.  Supervisors may also undertake programs of outreach, 
education, and training to enhance the knowledge of the legal requirements or operation 
of pension systems.  Supervisors often seek to communicate with a range of parties 
including fund managers, service providers, members, and the public.  
Communication activities of supervisors have a wide range of goals and objectives. Some 
communication programs may have the purpose of informing pension funds about the 
intent and nature of the supervisor’s activities to maximize the capacity for cooperation 
and make the interactions with fund more efficient.  Others are intended to advance the 
understanding of the regulatory structure as well as rights and responsibilities of funds 
and their members to facilitate compliance with the rules or to advance the exercise of 
individual rights of action by members. Communication may also be intended to leverage 
resources and establish a climate of deterrence among funds by publicizing the 
enforcement actions of the supervisor. 
Basic types of communication by supervisors are:   
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Disclosure is a means of communication with the public. Supervisors make public a 
portion of the information they receive, process, or issue, in publications and individual 
disclosure notes. Disclosure programs are typically designed to provide the basis for 
individuals to scrutinize the activities of pension funds to support private rights of action, 
to ensure that funds are exposed to scrutiny to provide a deterrent to prohibited actions or 
to enhance competition among funds.  The utilization and reliance on disclosure and the 
nature of these programs are key indicators of the degree to which supervisory systems 
are reliant on indirect forms of compliance enforcement and market forces rather than 
directive interventions.  
Outreach and education activities are communication efforts undertaken by supervisors 
to raise the awareness of the operation and requirements of pension systems.  These may 
be directed to the public and members of the pension funds to educate them about their 
rights and responsibilities under the law, or to the industry to raise the awareness of 
compliance issues or understanding of the supervisor standards or operations. These may 
take the form of publications, websites, or regular programs of consultation with the 
industry, on an individual or collective basis. Similar to disclosure, the nature and extent 
of outreach and education programs are indicative of the underlying style and approach 
of supervision.  Systems with few efforts to interact in this manner will typically be more 
directive in nature, relying nearly exclusively on action by the supervisor, while programs 
with extensive outreach and education activities place greater weight on the role and 
action of third parties in the supervisory process. These types of programs are also a form 
of preventive rather than remedial supervision, because their ultimate goal is to educate 
practitioners about how to remain in compliance and to deter problems by enhancing the 
capacity of third parties to provide oversight. 
Training.  In some countries, the supervisor also provides more formal training to ensure 
that the managers of pension funds are adequately prepared, or as a specific requirement 
prior to some form of licensing or entry control. This may be general training on the laws 
or a response to significant changes or on specific areas of fund operation such as: risk-
management and investment practices, criteria to evaluate third-party service providers; 
and compliance with technical regulatory requirements. 
Communication is differentiated among pension systems by the scope and purpose of the 
activities.  Supervisory systems that impose strong controls and have little reliance on 
external or market processes are very directive in their communication with funds 
regarding compliance issues, and they are likely to engage in few activities designed to 
facilitate compliance or enhance deterrence.  Systems with more procedurally oriented 
standards or a greater reliance on external processes will engage in a more interactive 
communication process. They will typically have far more extensive outreach and 
education programs that support negotiated settlement of compliance issues and rely on 








The manner and extent to which supervisors analyze and evaluate the information they 
receive from pension funds is usually closely linked to the system’s legal and regulatory 
approach. Legal frameworks that are based on quantitative standards lead supervisors to 
extensive measurement efforts that compare funds’ financial status and activities to 
normative standards.  This often involves complex calculations of individual funds that 
may be undertaken as frequently as daily.  Pension system founded in the Anglo Saxon 
tradition of trust law tend to be oriented toward comparative analysis, and hence follow a 
less frequent process of evaluating funds against benchmarks or the behavior of the entire 
industry.  The analysis in these systems may also be less focused on the outcome of 
financial decisions than the process of decision-making, or in determining relationships 
among the various parties involved in managing the assets and affairs of the funds. 
Measurement and analysis elements of supervision can therefore be evaluated on the 
basis of the purpose, frequency, and intensity of the activity.  Systems that are very 
intensive and proactive undertake analysis very frequently, with the intent to discern as 
soon as possible, if not in advance, when the fund may drift outside an established 
standard of behavior or engage in a violation of the requirements. These attributes may 
also be associated with risk-based approaches to supervision, in which complex 
algorithms or “scoring” systems based on extensive calculations may be the basis for 
decisions about supervisory interventions. 
At the other end of the spectrum are systems that are oriented toward keeping funds 
within a loosely defined and often situational or relative set of standards. Here analysis is 
far less frequent or intensive.  This represents an approach that relies more on external or 
market forces, or, in some circumstances, on the presence of extensive regulation and 
oversight of other aspects of financial market operation. 
5. Intervention 
 
All supervisory programs are continually faced with decisions about whether and how to 
intervene in the operation of pension funds. It is often difficult to separate intervention 
from some of the key aspects of the communication with the funds. Interventions may 
take the form of explicit requirements for the fund to either undertake, or desist from 
engaging in, certain activities that carry the force of law and must be complied with 
immediately.  In other systems interventions may be in the form of findings that are 
presented to the funds for a response.  The process of intervening in these circumstances 
is likely to be in the form of negotiations in which issues are resolved, or a process of 
litigation through the civil courts, where the ultimate resolution is reached through a 
judicial process  
A key issue that defines the nature of interventions is the force of authority  given to the 
supervisor and the nature of the process through which interventions occur. In some 
countries, the supervisor simply has the authority to intervene when a finding is made 
that a fund is, or may be, approaching non-compliance. Fund managers may in some 
cases be provided with very little if any recourse to negotiate or appeal.  In other   
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countries, the supervisor has little capacity to unilaterally impose sanctions and instead 
intervenes through a far less directive process of consultation, notification and perhaps 
negotiation. The most basic and important feature of the notification of compliance 
actions is the manner in which individual funds are notified by the supervisor when they 
are deemed to be out of compliance with legal requirements.  This can range from 
regularly scheduled interaction that may occur as often as daily in some countries, to 
formal notices. In some cases there are simply directives from the supervisor to the fund 
to make changes.  The manner of this sort of intervention and the nature of the process 
that follows, whether it is completely directive or a form of negotiated settlement, is 
perhaps the aspect of the supervisor’s activities that most defines the nature and style of 
supervision. Another key variation is the involvement of third parties in interventions.  
Some systems require that all actions be taken through the courts.  Others establish a 
formal process of appeal to a specially constituted group.  
Interventions by supervisors are therefore differentiated partially by the degree to which 
they are pro-active or occur only after conclusive evidence of non-compliance is 
established.  They are also distinguished by the extent to which they are directive and 
represent the unilateral exercise of authority to which there is little or no appeal, or 




As is the case with any form of compliance enforcement, the ultimate, and perhaps most 
important, element of pension supervision is the capacity to take corrective action.   
Although this may seem conceptually difficult to separate from intervention, the range of 
types and purposes of corrective action may vary across supervisory systems that are 
otherwise quite similar.  The variation in the type of corrective actions that a supervisor 
may take, however, makes it an important element to evaluate on its own. 
There are essentially three types of corrective actions: punitive, remedial, and 
compensatory.  Supervisory programs may engage in all three types or may be limited 
exclusively in their authority to only one.  Punitive actions are designed to impose 
penalties on the funds for actions deemed adverse to interests of members. They are 
distinguished by both form and intent.  Penalties are usually fines that are paid to the 
supervisor and may be retained by the authority or become part of public revenues.  Their 
intent is to establish deterrence and punish behavior outside of the standards. 
Remedial actions are those taken by a supervisory authority to remedy the consequences 
of a failure to comply with the law. These are essentially a way to reverse the outcome of 
non-compliance.  Remedial sanctions may simply be require the fund to return to a prior 
status or to cease certain actions.  In some cases, this may involve financial sanctions that 
are limited to rectifying any direct result of negligence or malfeasance by responsible 
parties. They may also be applied to correct abuses of the favorable tax status afforded to 
pension funds or harm suffered by parties that may have been involved in transactions 
with the funds.  The primary intent of these corrective actions is to rectify any direct   
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negative outcomes and prevent a recurrence.  There is, of course, a deterrent effect that 
will result from this approach, but it is more indirect. 
Compensatory corrective actions go beyond the remedial outcomes and seek to 
compensate aggrieved parties for both the direct and indirect effects of violations. Rather 
than simply reversing the outcomes, these are intended to compensate affected parties for 
the consequences of actions determined to be inappropriate.  Compensatory damages will 
typically be in conjunction with remedial actions and effectively compensate for any 
damages.  These types of actions have a strong deterrent intent, but they also have the 
purpose of ensuring that harm is minimized. 
Corrective activities of supervisory systems are distinguished by the degree to which they 
are solely focused on remedial outcomes, correcting problems as they occur, or whether 
they extend into the arena of compensation and punitive provisions that attempt to 
establish a more self-enforcing regime of deterrence. 
 
Methodology 
Comparative analysis of the attributes of the supervisory programs of different countries 
requires the development of a method to assign descriptive values to each of the primary 
elements. To achieve this, an approach that assigns a summary value from 1 to 5 for the 
intensity of activities within each of the elements was developed. These values are then 
compared with some of the characteristics of the pension system and basic information 
about the macroeconomic and developmental environment in which it operates to assess 
whether any indications of relationships between design, context, and supervisory 
practices can be found. 
The summary score for each element is derived from a set of five attribute scales that 
measure the degree of intensity and intervention. This approach is taken because 
supervisory systems represent an array of attributes deemed to represent a set of choices 
made along a spectrum of possible alternatives. Although each function of a supervisor 
could conceivably be assigned a unique descriptive scale along which it would be placed, 
there is sufficient commonality in the purpose and nature of the elements to allow them to 
be condensed in to a set of common scales, one or more of which is applied to each 
element. The score for each element is assigned by considering factors such as the 
frequency of reporting; the amount and type of information reported to the supervisor; the 
amount of analysis that underlies supervisory decisions and interventions; the degree to 
which the supervisor has authority to unilaterally direct funds to take certain actions: the 
intensity and direction of communication activities; and the overall regime for the 
application of sanctions.  
 
The five scales that describe the attributes of supervision are shown schematically below: 
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Figure 1: Intensity Scales for Pension Supervision Activities 
 
 
Restrictive           Open 
 
Pro-Active                                          Reactive 
 
Comprehensive         Exception Based 
 
Directive            Negotiated 
 
Corrective            Deterrent 
 
This approach is selected because it describes the full range of the attributes that are 
observed among supervisory systems and also because it does this in a manner that 
evaluates the elements in relation to the degree to which they represent interventions to 
address market imperfections or to directly secure the interests of pension fund members. 
A score of 1 represents elements that are implemented with characteristics shown on the 
left side of the scales and a score of 5 represents elements deemed to be consistent with 
the characteristics on the right side. 
These scales are consistent with analysis of supervisory styles and methods outlined in 
the limited literature on the subject.  All of the values on the left side of the scales 
represent supervisory methods that have been previously described as “draconian” 
(Vittas, 1998) “pro-active” or “highly prescriptive” (Rocha, Hinz and Guiterriez, 2001)) 
while those on the right as flexible or reactive. They effectively differentiate on the basis 
of the depth, intensity, periodicity and intent of the supervisor’s activities. 
The following provides a practical illustration of how the scoring mechanism works in 
the context of the scale of attributes described above. 
Restrictive systems impose high entry barriers in which the supervisor requires the 
submission and validation of extensive information prior to the licensing or approval of 
initial operation of pension funds, trustees, pension fund managers, custodians, etc.   
Market entry is generally restricted to a small number of entities that meet rigorous 
standards. In our scoring scheme, such a system would receive a score close to five for 
the Licensing and Analysis functions. A score of one, by contrast, is assigned in opposite 
instances where there is no (or minimal) involvement of the supervisor in assessing the 
qualification of funds or other relevant participants for market entry. Such systems are 
sometimes characterized as open and the approach of the supervisor is deemed to be 
reactive.    
14 
Supervisory environments are reactive or exception-based when the supervisor has little 
or infrequent interaction with the supervised entities and intervenes, in a remedial 
fashion, only to restore compliance with the legal standards. In such regimes, intervention 
is often triggered by external signals like whistle-blowers or auditors rather than arising 
as a result of the regular monitoring of conducted by the supervisor.  
At the other end of the spectrum, supervisors are perceived to be proactive when they 
intervene on a regular basis in order to preemptively address violations of standards or to 
prevent what is perceived to be undesirable behavior. This sort of approach typically 
involves intensive interaction between the supervisor and the pension funds through 
frequent of collection of information and consultations on issues such as investment 
management decisions.  
The exercise of supervisory authority can range anywhere from a directive, unilateral 
intervention in restoring compliance to a negotiated, participative process. The actual 
position between these two extremes depends on the nature and scope of authority 
provided to the supervisor, it’s degree of independence and the availability of legal 
venues to enforce compliance and  impose sanctions.  
 
Cross – Country Evaluation 
This section describes pension supervision in eight countries, within this analytical 
framework. Each country description is followed by a chart that displays the intensity of 
supervision activity on a scale of one to five for every functional element using the 
methodology described above.  
Australia  
 
The retirement system in Australia consists of three pillars: a means-tested, taxpayer 
financed old age pension; a mandatory tax-supported occupational superannuation
1plan, 
and a voluntary pillar. Superannuation schemes are structured as trusts, in the tradition of 
the English Trust Law. The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) is an 
integrated supervisor for the entire financial system
2 that overlooks the activity of a 
superannuation system with over 11,433 funds holding assets of over $300 billion.  
In Australia, the supervisory system is viewed as very open. Many of the superannuation 
funds can enter the market without going through any kind of licensing procedure,
3 while 
others must only seek approval for their trustees.   
                                                 
1 In Australia the term superannuation is preferred to pension for historical reasons – retirement benefits 
used to be paid as lump sums at retirement. (OECD report)  
2 APRA supervises banks; securities; insurance companies; and pension funds. The Australian Securities 
and Investment Commission and the Australian Tax Office share some superannuation supervisory 
responsibilities with APRA.  
3 There are approximately 3000 funds that sis not require approved trustees to enter the market. (APRA)   
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APRA monitors information obtained from trustees and informal sources like the media 
and whistle-blowers. The monitoring activity has relatively low intensity, since the flow 
and amount of information that is reported and disclosed to APRA is fairly limited. It is 
mandatory for superannuation funds to submit regular financial statements known as 
statutory returns on a yearly basis. Those funds that use derivatives for hedging risk also 
submit risk management statements, disclosing their policy towards managing portfolio 
risk. 
Most of the responsibilities regarding disclosure of information to members, handling 
complaints on members’ rights, decisions regarding portfolio management, and 
measurement of results are handled by the pension trusts themselves. In this respect, 
APRA’s role is very limited, suggesting a rather reactive, exception-based approach. 
Moreover, the trustees themselves widely out-source these responsibilities to specialized 
financial service providers, adding another layer of intermediaries to the process. APRA 
is not involved in checking the performance of these intermediaries.  
Although the monitoring, analysis, and most of the communication function that APRA 
carries out are reactive, the outreach component of the communication function is highly 
intensive. APRA publishes a very large amount of material on superannuation policy as 
well as performance measurement of funds and makes this easily accessible on its web-
site. It has also initiated an international outreach effort to share experience with other 
integrated supervisors around the world. APRA reaches out to trustees providing training 
and guidelines of compliance with regulation, principles for safe administration, reporting 
and disclosure.  
In terms of intervention, in October 2003, APRA began to implement a risk based 
approach aimed at tailoring the frequency and the intensity of interactions with pension 
funds to the risk profile of the supervised entities. APRA estimates risk-profiles based on 
several indicators including the probability of fund failure, the impact of an eventual 
failure And the quality of fund management although it is early in the implementation 
process, it is likely that this approach will reduce the number of interventions with funds,  
and it promises to increase activity in the more preventive-oriented supervision functions 
like monitoring, communication, and analysis.  
In the context of our conceptual framework, therefore Australia’s pension supervisory 
systems is classified as open, with moderately reactive monitoring, communication, and 
analysis functions and a moderately corrective intervention mechanism. The introduction 
of the risk-assessment tools will gradually cause APRA to become more proactive in 
communication, monitoring, and analysis with the stated goal of preventing rather than 
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The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority introduced in October of 2003 a risk-
based approach to the performance measurement and analysis activities inherent to 
pension fund supervision. This new approach is based on two central tools: The 
Probability and Impact Rating System (PAIRS) and the Supervisory, Oversight and 
Response System (SOARS).  
PAIRS – Probability and Impact Rating System (see Annex)  is  APRA’s main risk 
measurement tool . It is currently applied to roughly 3000 regulated entities. and generates 
two estimates: the probability of fund failure, over a five year horizon, and the impact of 
entity failure, should it occur.  
The probability of fund failure is obtained by looking at the ability of find to manage risk 
and its capital position. An precise measure of the funds ability to manage risk is difficult 
to ascertain but an estimate is calculated by analyzing the internal systems for corporate 
governance, the degree of internal compliance; the composition and performance of the 
board and executive management etc.  
The impact of entity failure is calculated as a measure of the entity’s size and of the 
amount of assets it administers.  
SOARS – Supervisory, Oversight and Response System (see Annex)is APRA’s tool to 
determine the level of intervention that fits best the “risk-profile” of the supervised 
entities, obtained by using PAIRS. To each of the four supervisory stances prescribed by 
PAIRS, SOARS prescribes corresponding mandatory interventions. For “normal entities” 
the regular schedule of on-site inspections every two years is applied. For “oversight 
entities” APRA imposes stricter capital requirement provisions; engages more in 
communication and performs more frequent visits. “Mandated Improvement” entities 
receive vigorous intervention and “Restructure entities” have their business transferred to 
other entities while protecting the interests of participants.  
This system is too new to be able to have any relevant performance measurement. It 
would be very interesting to monitor its activity in the future and obtain information on 
the accuracy of the predictions based on the actual data from the entities, especially on the 
probability of failure. 
Another thing that would be important to observe is the performance of the entities after 
the APRA interventions dictated by SOARS. It would be useful to asses weather this 
system actually improves the efficiency of the organization allows a better allocation of 
supervisory resources.  
If positive effects emerge after careful examination, attention should be given to the 
possibility of implemented similar instruments in other countries, where the environment 
permits.    
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United States 
The United States has a universal public Social Security system that targets a modest 
replacement rate of 40% on average.  This is supplemented by an extensive voluntary 
occupational pension system that includes more than 700,000 privately managed funds. 
These funds are regulated and supervised by the tax authority, the Internal Revenue 
Service, which administers provision related to the minimum funding and distribution, 
and terms of benefits required to qualify for preferential tax treatment and the Employee 
Benefits Security Administration (EBSA) of the US Department of Labor that 
administers the provision related to standards for the investment and management of 
assets and the reporting and disclosure of information. 
The system is fully open with no requirement for licensing or advance approval of private 
pension fund to operate. The supervision of the system is highly re-active with 
interventions occurring almost exclusively on an exception basis.  The supervisory 
authorities primarily intervene on the basis of specific requests or information indicating 
problems with a particular employer or pension plan. The supervisory system is 
moderately oriented toward monitoring and disclosure with requirements for the 
provision of extensive financial and operating information.  This, however, is only 
provided annually or on a less frequent basis for the smaller plans. The supervisors have a 
limited analytical and evaluation programs that are largely used to identify possible 
problems for further investigations rather than as the basis for any corrective actions. 
The supervisory system in the US is strongly oriented toward information disclosure and 
private rights of action rather than extensive interventions by the supervisory authorities.  
Similarly it relies on private auditors for the verification of the completeness and 
accuracy of financial disclosures rather than direct oversight. 
The system provides very limited capacity for pre-emptive interventions and corrective 
actions, generally requiring supervisors to notify pension funds of a finding of violations 
of the law and often achieving corrections through negotiated settlements.  The 
supervisors have relatively weak authority for corrective actions and must bring civil 
actions through the courts when unable to negotiate resolution of issues. The law 
provides no capacity for the supervisors to impose punitive or compensatory sanctions 
beyond the imposition of modest penalties and excise taxes for certain types of violations 
of the law. 
In recent years, supervisors have become increasingly oriented toward education, 
technical assistance and voluntary compliance programs in which they attempt to prevent 
problems by educating practitioners about the law and raising the awareness of individual 
participants about their rights and responsibilities to monitor the activities of their 
employer’s plans. Supervision in this system is therefore characterized by a strong 
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Box 2:  































The prudent person rule is used increasingly as a behaviorally-oriented standard for 
participants in financial markets as a building block for governance systems.  
An acceptable definition of this rule is: “a fiduciary must discharge his or her duties with 
the care, skill, prudence and diligence that a prudent person acting in a like capacity 
would use in the conduct of an enterprise of like character and aims”.  
The prudent person rule originates in trust law where the institution of “trust”, which is 
usually a mass of assets is managed by the “trustee” for the benefit of a another person. 
The prudent person rule designates responsibilities focused on general conduct in 
administering these assets and not on the results of the administration process.  
The prudent person rule generates legal duties and responsibilities that establish fiduciary 
obligations that seek to minimize potential divergences of interest in relationships where 
one party is particularly vulnerable to another (principal-agent problem). Effective 
enforcement of legal liability of this rule is essential for the rule’s successful 
implementation.  
The “prudent person rule” is a good model of governance because it combines obligation 
and duty with accountability without necessarily invoking the state or its regulatory 
agencies. It is a simple rule that general enough to avoid conflicts and inefficiencies 
generated by jurisdictional overlaps and it gives formal status to entities to which it is 
applied, allowing independence from competing interests and a minimum of intervention 
in the administrative process itself.  
In the context of pension provision, this rule is applied in various ways. In countries that 
share a trust-based law system, the rule applies to fiduciaries with very little additional 
quantitative or qualitative restrictions set forth in laws and regulations. In other countries 
this rule is accompanied by quantitative rules limiting self investments or investments in 
risky assets or by limitations on the use of custodians, etc.  
Since, by definition this rule assigns very general standards of conduct, interpretation is 
required to ensure on-going compliance and sanction misbehavior. The role of the 
regulatory agencies in interpreting and implementing this rule becomes crucial for a 
successful implementation, especially in countries with that have little experience with 






In Ireland, pension provision is managed primarily through occupational and personal 
voluntary plans organized as trusts. Several institutions have supervisory responsibilities 
for the pension system but the primary supervisors are the Pension Board for 
occupational pension plans and the Department of Enterprise, Trade, and Employment 
for personal pension plans. The Pension Board is a specialized institution that supervises 
close to 100,000 pension funds holding assets of ∉44 billion .  
As in Australia, the Irish pension system operates by relying heavily on the institution of 
the “trustee” and the “prudent person rule”. As a result, the Irish system is open, with 
very few barriers for pension funds to enter the market. The Pension Board does not issue 
any licenses per se, rather pension trusts get approved by the Revenue Commissioners 
and register with the Pension Board before entering the market.  
On an on-going basis, The Pension Board monitors the activity and conduct of plan 
trustees and other participants in a passive, reactive manner. The so-called whistle 
blowers rules play a key role in the monitoring activity of Irish supervision. In Ireland 
auditors, actuaries, trustees, or other parties involved in the pension provision process 
have an affirmative responsibility to report potential violations to the authority. One can 
argue that heavy reliance on whistleblowers means delegating the detailed monitoring 
activities to them, therefore reducing monitoring responsibilities for the supervisor. This 
characteristic underscores the highly reactive character of Irish pension supervision. 
Indeed, the system design places nearly all of the burden of measurement and analysis on 
the shoulders of the trustees and auditors. 
In terms of communication, the Pension Board is not very active. There is a strong 
emphasis on information disclosure from pension funds and trustees to members, 
employers, and other participants. There is no requirement to report on a regular basis to 
the supervisory authorities regarding future investment policies and performance 
indicators. Trustees must have their accounts audited yearly and have all documents 
available to present to the supervisor upon request, but there is no interaction during their 
review. The Pension Board issues guidelines or guidance notes on the duties and 
responsibilities of plan trustees and codes of practice on specific aspects of their 
responsibilities. The Pension Board is also involved in the provision of appropriate 
training for trustees. Much of the communications are outsourced to a separately 
constituted Pension Ombudsman who investigates and decides complaints and disputes 
involving occupational pension plans.  
Despite the fact that the Pension Board has strong powers to carry out proactive 
investigations in auditing pension funds for compliance, it does not use this power in   
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practice. In 2002, only 165 schemes out of a total of 100,000 were audited.
4 For this 
reason, we still consider intervention to be highly reactive and exception-based in Ireland.  
An interesting feature of the Irish pension supervision system is that the Pension Board is 
granted wide discretion regarding intervention in the event of non-compliance and very 
strong correction power. The Pension Board has the power to prosecute offences in court 
with penalties ranging from fines to imprisonment of trustees. Although there is a high 
punitive discretion available to the supervisor for instances of non-compliance, these 
correction and intervention powers are primarily used remedially, to restore lost rights to 
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Hungary has a relatively new three pillar system, with a public, mandatory first pillar; a 
mandatory fully-funded privately managed second pillar; and a third, privately managed, 
voluntary pillar. The Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority (HFSA), established in 
2000, is an integrated supervisor for the enitre financial sector, including pensions. In 
Hungary, the number of privately-managed pension funds is very small and 
correspondingly, the market concentration is very high: 6 funds hold 87% of membership 
and 83% of the total value of assets, which amounted to 1.7 billion Euro in 2003.  
                                                 
4 The number of investigations initiated by the Pension Board in 2002 was only 74. This number is very 
small considering that there are 100000 funds under its supervision.    
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The supervisory act which is implemented by HFSA is a proactive structure directed 
towards ascertaining compliance with regulations by investigating fulfillment of internal 
control mechanisms of the supervised entities.  
Since the funded component of the Hungarian pension system is fairly new, HFSA 
coordinates a licensing process focused on ensuring compliance with the fairly restrictive 
legal standards for market entry. Funds have to obtain licenses to establish a fund, to 
initiate fund operation, to implement the benefit regulations, and to start the provision of 
fund services. In addition, funds must produce extensive and detailed documentation to 
obtain these licenses and also must register with the tax authorities and other institutions 
prior to applying for a license at HFSA. Licenses are now permanent but they replaced a 
more intense, temporary, licensing arrangement. 
HFSA’s monitoring activity is very focused since information about transactions are 
reported daily by the pension funds so the supervisor can check compliance with the strict 
investment regulations in real time. In practice, transactions are checked randomly but 
there is a detailed examination of the accounting and internal control systems. HFSA also 
receives quarterly and annual reports from the funds that support monitoring of fund 
performance.  
In terms of measurement and analysis of the fund’s performance, the Hungarian 
supervisor uses benchmarks of market performance to judge the risk level and the 
investment performance for the portfolio. These ratios are calculated and reported by the 
supervised entities. In the future, HFSA is planning to move to a Value at Risk approach 
for assessing potential risk and allocating oversight resources. 
5 
HFSA communicates with the supervised entities in an interactive, negotiated way. It 
initiates consultations on a regular basis with fund managers, holds information sessions 
and issues guidelines.
6 It also reaches out to the entire sector by publishing regular 
findings on good practices for sustainable fund administration.  
On-site inspections and investigations of pension funds are quite frequent and 
comprehensive, covering a large number of official documents. Currently, there are three 
types of on-site inspections: comprehensive, targeted, and follow-up. These inspections 
can even be targeted to one fund or a group of funds.
7 This situation makes HFSA’s 
intervention activity intensive but less so than in Chile, for example. The fact that most of 
these interventions are aimed at restoring compliance and the low incidence of 
                                                 
5 The Value at Risk approach allows for fine-tuning the risk assessment and reducing both the measurement 
and the interventional activities undertaken by the supervisor. This measure basically looks at two elements 
of a pension fund: the probability of failure and the impact of failure. This approach is extensively used in 
the supervision of the banking and insurance sectors.  
6 HFSA reports more success in compliance coming out of this communication activity than from 
administering punitive corrections like fines.  
7 The frequency for mandatory pension plans is every 2 years and every 2-3 years for voluntary plans. 
There were 160 on-site investigations only in 2001   
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compliance actions indicates that, although intensive, the activity of HFSA is mainly 
directed toward deterrence.
8 
The primary means of imposing sanctions administered is through the issuance of what 
are known as resolutions. These are formal pronouncements by the HFSA, stating 
specific findings of non compliance with the law and standards. These statements inform 
the supervised entities of their state of non-compliance and suggest corrective actions. 
Other possible interventions are: suspension of member recruitment; withdrawal of 
operation licenses, and penalties. The other corrective actions that HFSA applies are 
aimed mainly at restoring compliance with applicable requirements and preventing the 
occurrence of adverse events that could affect the financial sustainability of the fund. 
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In Mexico there are several vehicles for defined contribution, privately-managed 
retirement savings. The main one is a mandatory occupational pension system for 
salaried employees. There is also a form of voluntary occupational pension through 
which employers can offer an additional option to save for retirement. A voluntary 
personal pension system is also in place, mainly for the self-employed. One of the most 
important features of the Mexican system is that the management of the funds is 
separated from the investment activity and entrusted to two separate institutions: the 
                                                 
8 There is hope that the need for on-site comprehensive inspections will be reduced with the introduction of 
the Value at Risk monitoring mechanism.    
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AFORES,
9 which are the fund administrators and managers, and the SIEFORES, which 
are specialized retirement savings investment funds. These institutions are legally 
separate and they have to go through separate approval processes before they are allowed 
to function. 
The main supervisor is CONSAR, a specialized pension supervisor. CONSAR’s 
approach to supervision is proactive because it has established mechanisms to prevent 
operating risks in the activity of the fund managers and fund investors, in stead of acting 
after the violation has been produced. 
The access to market is controlled by the supervisor by enforcing very strict capital and 
reserve requirements. AFORES and SIEFORES have to be licensed separately. To 
complete this process, they have to prepare and submit a very large number of documents 
attesting compliance with regulation, including a self-regulation program. This process is 
very similar to the one in place in Hungary.  
CONSAR monitors detailed, transaction-based information reported daily by the 
supervised entities through a computerized information system that allows for integrated 
surveillance. In addition, since 2002, CONSAR uses the Value at Risk (VaR) method to 
monitor risk of the pension funds and tailor intervention. The VaR monitoring method 
captures the volatility of different risk factors that affect the investments of the 
SIEFORES. VaR is calculated daily by an independent consultant and is reported daily to 
CONSAR. 
CONSAR’s intervention activity is intensive and directive. There is at least one on-site 
visit per year for each entity, and CONSAR may request additional on-site visits at any 
time. The triggers for additional on-site inspectors can be risk-analysis, sanctions, 
information from comptrollers, external auditors, and planning.
10  
The main corrections applied by CONSAR are fines.
11 These have a punitive role and are 
quite numerous. In 2002 there were 19910 corrections applied. CONSAR can also take 
administrative actions to correct bad behavior. Fines cannot exceed the equivalent of 5% 
of the paid-in capital and reserves of the company.  
It is important to note a few key elements regarding the Mexican pension supervision 
approach. Since its creation, CONSAR has worked to develop mechanisms to prevent 
risks in the operation of the Afores and Siefores, and so it has moved away from acting 
after the violation have already been committed. It therefore moved form the reactive to 
the proactive side of the spectrum. CONSAR was able to update its supervision models 
from a surveillance of the correct accounting registries to an integral surveillance which 
analyzes processes through the introduction of advanced information technology.  
While CONSAR collects a great deal of information, it does not focus on disclose that is 
primarily the responsibility of the fund administrators, the AFORES, who provide most 
of the information disclosure to members. They are required to have web-sites with 
                                                 
9 There are 13 AFORES in the Mexican system 
10 In 2002 Consar made 74 on-site inspections, from which 56% were made to the Afores.  
 
11 Fines cannot exceed the equivalent of 5% of the paid-in capital and reserves of the company.   
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readily available info on each SIEFORE, general policies of risk management and 
indicators regarding the market, liquidity and credit risk and graphs, and charts with 
historic rates of return, risk-adjusted rate of return, and the administration fees charged to 
the workers. AFORES must publish on a monthly basis the breakdown of each of the 
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As defined contribution, privately managed pension provision arrangements expand 
across countries, the final retirement income becomes increasingly exposed to market 
risk, inherent for financial investment transactions. While considering investment choices 
to secure the long-term goals of retirement welfare, the administrators, managers and 
supervisors of pension funds have to mitigate a variety of risk categories: credit risk, 
market risk, liquidity risk, legal and operational risk, etc.  
Value at Risk (VaR) models have been accepted by banking and insurance regulators as a  
standard tool to quantify risk and control exposure to market risk. VaR is defined as the 
maximum potential change in value of a portfolio of financial instruments, with a given 
probability over a certain time horizon. This estimation starts by marking to market all the 
assets in the portfolio and then, based on the probability distribution of the market returns, 
over a defined period of time,  it estimates potential losses. 
The motivation for this particular approach is that improper estimation of risk, at the 
underlying asset level, leads to sub-optimal capital allocation with severe consequences 
for the profitability or the institutions’ financial stability. 
Risk management techniques based on the Value at Risk approach are widespread in the 
banking and insurance sector. They are starting to become popular in the pension arena, in 
countries that have established solid defined contribution, privately managed pillars for 
retirement income provision. VaR can have many applications and it is used both for risk 
management and for regulatory purposes.  The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
and the Bank for International Settlements call for financial institutions such as banks and 
investment funds to meet capital requirements based on VaR estimates.  
The main purpose of introducing a VaR approach to risk management and capital 
regulation is to tie capital requirements more closely to the underlying risk if the assets in 
the portfolio. For pension funds and insurance companies this exercise is especially 
important since they operate on a mandate which stipulates that their capital shall be 
sufficient to cover future liabilities and claims, usually on a long-term time horizon. 
Among the countries that have introduced risk management tools based on Value at Risk 
principles, Mexico is a prominent example. Portfolio composition and asset value is 
reported daily, at market value, allowing for close estimation of probability distributions 
for returns. Risk exposure is also managed with investment rules, that restrict asset 
categories; counterparty exposure limits and benchmarking of liquidity indicators. This 
approach replaced an older system that measured risk using average weighted maturity 
calculations.  As VaR tools are introduced, the weight of these quantitative restrictions in 
the risk management tools portfolio is decreasing, allowing for a more market-linked and 
modern regulatory regime.  Another country that is currently considering to implement a 




Saving for retirement in Chile is done primarily through a system of mandatory, defined 
contribution, private pension schemes where assets accumulate in individual accounts. 
Workers can also save for retirement in voluntary savings accounts, and the self-
employed can contribute voluntarily to the private pension schemes offered by banks or 
insurance companies. 
There is patrimonial and legal separation between the administrators of the funds 
(Administrators de Fondos de Pensiones – AFPs) and the fund themselves. Also, 
contributors can choose, with some restrictions, among the different  AFP’s . 
The Superintendent of the Pension Fund Administrators (SAFP) is the specialized 
institution that regulates the establishment, structure, functions, and power of the pension 
fund administrators. It is an autonomous public body under the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Provision. 
As in Mexico and Argentina, the Superintendent carries out a very detailed and intense 
screening process of the pension fund administrators before each is allowed to enter the 
market. Eligibility for a license is also contingent upon fulfilling conditions regarding 
capitalization, insurance, and management personnel.  
Since the activity of the pension fund administrators is heavily regulated, the 
Superintendent’s actions are primarily focused on ensuring compliance with these 
regulations. Both the monitoring and the measurement and analysis functions are very 
intensive. Most of the analysis is done by the Risk Classification Commission established 
within the Superintendent and it consists of approving securities, assigning a risk 
classification to each of these securities, and also assessing the investments in foreign 
assets.  
Intervention is also very intensive. The SAFP not only analyses the portfolio choices of 
the AFPs but it also takes part of the responsibility for investment by issuing approval for 
certain securities. Under these circumstances, the SAFP plays a proactive role in 
managing the risks associated with investment of the funds and not just in assessing those 
risks.  
Communication with the supervised entities has relatively low intensity and is directive 
since it involves mostly regular reporting from the part of the AFPs about performance 
regarding real yield of investments and portfolio composition. SAFP has the power to 
approve or disapprove of investing in certain assets but the supervisor imposes the results 
of the monitoring and analysis process. Also, there are no legal rules for whistleblowers, 
so the main information source regarding non-compliance is the supervisor itself. This is 
why we consider the communication process to be directive.  Communication with 
members falls within the responsibilities of the pension fund administrators.  
The Superintendent for Pension Fund Administrators corrects instances of non-
compliance by levying fines or initiating and supervising winding-up procedures. These 
kinds of corrections have a punitive character and serve as a deterrent for non-
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Argentina 
Argentina has an integrated pension system with a mixed public-private two-pillar 
structure. The second pillar has two components: a mandatory fully funded defined 
contribution plan, and a public, pay-as-you-go component. Employees can choose freely 
between the two components, but all workers must be enrolled in one of the mandatory 
plans. The pension funds are called FJP (Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones) and are 
administered by the Administradoras de Fondos de Jubilaciones y Pensiones (AFJP). 
Pension fund assets are independent and separated from the AFJPs.  The supervisory 
institution for the Argentine pension fund administrators is the SAFJP (Superintendencia 
de Administradoras de Fondos de Jubilaciones y Pensiones) 
Like in Mexico and Chile, the pension market is very concentrated, with only 12 AFJP-
(in December 2003) administering   46 billion pesos in pension assets
12. The costs of fund 
operation for these funds are very high. Regulation of the Argentine pension system has 
                                                 
12 There was a process of concentration in the sector which had 24 administrators operating when the 
system began and 12 by the end of  2003. As of the end of 2003,  nearly  70% of the contributors  were 
affiliated with 4 AFJPs, with the largest one covering  almost one quarter of the market.   (Memoria 
Trimestral de la SAFJP). 
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been very conservative with strict licensing procedures, restrictions on investments, 
special reserves, and minimum investment returns. 
The monitoring activity conducted by the SAFJP is very intense and pro-active. The 
agency routinely examines information regarding the operation of the pension funds 
reported by, or requested from, the funds. The information it monitors is transaction-
based. The supervisor reviews financial statements prepared by the fund administrators 
and matches this with information provided by the custodians, financial institutions, and 
the capital market.  Transactions are valued at prices provided by the SAFJP based on the 
information provided by the market and valuation criteria established by the regulations.  
The supervisor has the right to request additional information and make both regular and 
ad-hoc inspections to enforce compliance.  
The Argentine supervisor also checks if the funds are complying with the disclosure 
mechanisms to members or beneficiaries. It reviews the advertising plans prepared by the 
pension funds. All these activities require very intensive communication between the 
supervisor and the fund administrators, and the supervisor and the public. Every 
trimester, SAFJP makes public a comprehensive document containing information 
regarding the performance of the funds, licenses that have been approved or suspended, 
level of commissions, number of members and beneficiaries in each scheme, current 
value of the funds, and the distribution of investments.  
SAFJP corrects non-compliance by levying fines and by enforcing compensatory 
mechanisms. For example, interventions would occur when an administrator calculates 
fees inaccurately and it must offer compensation to one or more members, or when fraud 
is committed in the affiliation of a member and the worker has to be returned to his or her 
original plan.  Corrective procedures may be enforced by the supervisor when systemic 
weaknesses are observed in regard to one or more critical processes in a pension fund 
administrator. Therefore, the corrective elements of pension supervisor in Argentina are 
primarily punitive, but also have a remedial component. This is important to distinguish 
the Argentine corrective functions from the Chilean and Mexican ones that are 
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Hong Kong has a three pillar pension system: a publicly managed, tax-financed social 
safety net; a mandatory, privately managed fully funded provident scheme, and a 
voluntary personal savings and insurance pillar. Within the mandatory provident scheme, 
a plan can be set up as a master-trust,
13 governing multiple companies, an industry 
scheme for an entire sector, or as an employer-sponsored scheme. 
The supervisory authority in Hong Kong is the Mandatory Provident Fund Authority 
(MPFA), established in 1998. All schemes are managed as individual accounts and must 
be set up under trust, with trustees approved by the Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes 
Authority.  
The number of privately managed schemes in Hong Kong is much smaller than in other 
countries with pension regulation based on Trust Law and the number of mandatory 
reporting requirements and adequacy criteria is correspondingly much higher, but the 
market can still be described as an open one.   
There are no formal licensing procedures apart from the approval of trustees, but the 
MPFA monitors and validates compliance with capital adequacy requirements that are in 
place.  
                                                 
13 In Hong Kong there are 299 schemes approved as Master Trust Schemes, 12 Industry Schemes and 10 
employer sponsored schemes in the Mandatory Provident Fund pillar out of 48 existing in 2004.    
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MPFA monitoring function is moderately intense.
14 Although the volume of information 
reported to the supervisor is fairly high, the trustees and auditors serve as an intermediary 
layer for monitoring this information. Master trusts, industry schemes, and employer-
sponsored schemes have to submit trustee returns annually containing mainly financial 
information; a statement with policy information and a report on internal controls that 
includes assessments from independent auditors regarding general performance as well as 
compliance with capital requirements. Trustees must also publish annually a consolidated 
report that is submitted to the MPFA and is accessible to any member upon request. 
Communication to members is generally the responsibility of the trustees. The supervisor 
ensures transparency by making available daily information about trustees and correction 
activities on its web-site.  
Apart from these traditional sources of information, MPFA also relies on whistleblowers 
(usually auditors) that must report to the supervisor whenever they become aware of non-
compliance. With regard to measurement and analysis, very little is done by the 
supervisor. This activity falls under the responsibility of the trustees and auditors.  
Investigations and other types of interventions occur whenever the supervisor believes 
there has been non-compliance. MPFA suspends or withdraws approval for trustees when 
the assessed non-compliance exceeds a certain limit. The supervisor can also initiate and 
supervise the procedure of scheme wind-up whenever a pension scheme has been unable 
to fulfill its responsibilities towards members.  
This approach toward supervision, particularly in regard to interventions and the 
frequency of interactions with funds suggests a re-active  approach that is typical of 
systems in which pension funds are established under trust law. 
Among the countries included in our analysis, the activities of the Mandatory Provident 
Fund Authority in Hong Kong appear to most closely resemble those carried out by 
Australian Prudential and Regulatory Authority, with the exception of the monitoring 
activity. The MPFA monitors more information in a more pro-active way than its 
Australian counterpart.  
 
                                                 
14 Trustees have to submit annual balance sheets, profit and loss accounts, as well as auditor’s reports and 
director’s report. They also have to submit an annual statement of any changes of significance in the 
performance of service providers or changes in the investment policy.  
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 Presence of Supervisory Styles. The most basic question regarding the classification of 
supervisory systems is whether any consistent patterns that support an overall summary 
characterization of system are discernable, whether there are discernible “styles” of 
supervision. The scales used to assign values to each element are broadly based on the 
intensity (i.e. the depth and frequency) of the activities. The most general hypothesis to 
be evaluated is whether supervisory systems may be deemed to be consistently high or 
lower intensity among the various primary elements examined. If the components of 
supervisory systems are fall consistently along such a scale they can be more readily 
compared to a variety of factors related to the environment in which they operate to 
formulate some explanatory relationships.  High levels of variation among the attributes  
would make such relationships far less meaningful. 
Two groupings of the elements indicate that the countries examined exhibit consistent 
supervisory “styles”.  Figure 8 below shows the distribution of the elements related to 
activities that are associated with the nature and intensity of four of the categories of 
activities, those associated with direct interventions in the activities of funds.  The clear 
pattern supports the proposition that there is consistency in the degree of intensity within 
various systems, allowing them to be characterized as generally proactive or reactive. 
This, of course, simply confirms that these supervisory systems are, at least by these 
measures, relatively consistent in their approach, which is to be expected if they are to be 
able to function as a cohesive program. It is important to note that the countries appear to 
fall across a continuum of “styles” rather than clustering at the two extremes. The United 
States and Australia can be characterized as essentially re-active systems, while Chile and   
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Mexico are strongly interventionist and pro-active in character with Hungary and Hong 
Kong occupying a middle ground. 
 
Figure 8. Correlation among Primary Elements of Pension Supervision 
 
The element that is rather strongly negatively correlated with others is communication.  
The prevalence of communication activities apparently increases in proportion to the 
degree to which other activities are re-active or exception based. This is intuitively 
logical because education and technical assistance are a likely adjunct to programs that 
rely on external actors and markets forces to induce compliance with regulations. They  
are perhaps best perceived as a type of agency costs of the regulator.  Figure 9 below 
shows the relationship between monitoring activities and communication where this 
connection is perhaps most direct, however, it applies to nearly all of the other elements 
as well.  This leads to the conclusion that supervisory systems have a broad distribution 
of characteristics patterns or styles that range from a largely re-active approach with a 
strong emphasis on communication, to strongly interventionist approach with 
considerably less effort devoted to providing information to the regulated entities.   
35 
 




The presence of relatively consistent patterns enables their comparison to factors that 
define the environment or context in which the supervisor operates. This permits an   
assessment of whether supervisory “styles” appear to be related to the legal and economic 
environment. Potential environmental factors that might determine an approach to 
supervision include the overall level of economic development of the country, the degree 
to which capital markets are developed, the capacity for reliance on legal procedures and 
private actions and the legal traditions of the country. The pathways of causality among 
these factors are potentially complex. These factors may simply constrain the feasible 
design of the pension system or they may more narrowly determine how any system 
would be supervised within such an environment. Whether the relationships are more 
general or specific to pension supervision, an initial evaluation of these relationships 
provides useful insights on the alignment of approaches to supervision and the 
environment in which they operate. 
 
Level of Development. The simplest of these comparisons is the relationship between 
overall level of economic development and supervision.  This is considered by comparing 
per capita GDP to the characteristics of the pension supervision. Figure 10 below shows 
the scores for the main operating characteristics of the sample of countries arrayed from 
left to right in relation to the per capita GDP of the country.    
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Figure 10 Primary Elements of Supervision and GDP/Head. 
 
This analysis indicates a strong relationship between overall level of economic 
development and the approach to private pension supervision.  Countries with the highest 
income levels are associated with supervisory approaches that impose fewer entry 
barriers and qualifications for pension funds and are less intensive and intervention 
oriented.  Those with a lower per capita GDP are associated with the more pro-active 
methods and less likely to rely on market discipline to control the pension systems. 
Although not shown on the graph, as indicated in Figure 9, the countries with higher 
levels of development are more oriented toward a reliance on communication in their 
methods. 
There are a variety of possible explanations for this relationship. The wealthier countries 
tend to provide more widely available social safety nets and universal social security 
systems so they are likely to be able to sustain greater levels of risk in their private 
pension systems.  Private pensions are consequently likely to be a less significant 
proportion of overall household wealth in these countries, making them better able to take 
risk in search of higher returns therefore leading to less restrictive supervisory regimes.  
Lower income countries, especially those that have established private pensions to 
replace or supplement public programs for fiscal reasons, have a much lower capacity to 
sustain such risk.  They are also likely to have large fiscal exposure through the various 
kinds of public guarantees usually required to enact the reforms. 
To a significant degree, the relationship is likely to be a result of the underlying nature of 
the pension system and the markets in which they operate.  The countries with the higher 
per capita income levels tend to have voluntary occupational systems that operate as 
second tier forms of financial intermediation.  The pension funds in these countries are   
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investing their assets in highly regulated financial markets, or in pooled investment 
products managed by other regulated institutions.  The business of fund management is 
more developed and the supervisor is able to utilize this primary regulation to diminish 
the degree to which interventions are required. 
In contrast, the lower income countries may not have the same institutional foundation to 
rely on and, therefore, must manage these risks using a more pro-active approach. The 
following sections examine some of these possible relationships in more detail. 
Capital Market Development. The ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP provides a 
measure of the “depth” of financial markets and financial market development (Levine, et 
al, 1999). Figure 11 shows countries ordered according to this measure. The expectation 
would be that in well developed markets, there are a large number of participants and a 
high level of primary or direct regulation of financial products. The competition among 
these actors fuels institutional development and creates venues for third party oversight 
that can take the form of comprehensive accounting rules or established auditing 
practices. In such systems, all of these layers of financial intermediation and professional 
affiliations are governed by primary market regulations that support less intensive 
supervisory oversight. Also, the high level of integration between the different branches 
of the financial industry allow for the development of fungible financial professionals 
that limit the need for specialized pension supervision. 
 
Figure 11 Primary Elements of Supervision and Financial Market Development (measured as 
market capitalization of traded companies to GDP) 
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This indicates that although in general there is a relationship between the depth of capital 
markets and approaches to supervision it does not fully explain the patterns.  Some of the 
countries with relatively high levels of market depth such as Chile have approaches to 
supervision that are more pro-active, while others with thinner markets, such as Ireland, 
have a less intensive approach, indicating that other factors are likely to influence 
patterns of supervision as well. Some less quantitative descriptors of the environment are, 
therefore, also potentially useful in understanding the impact of the environment in which 
pension funds operate on supervisory techniques. 
Legal Systems and the “Rule of Law” As already mentioned in the introduction, Levine 
(1998,1999) and Levine Layaza and Beck (1999) trace the relationship of legal systems,  
financial development to economic growth finding that legal origin accounts for cross-
country differences in the development of bank and stock markets.  Pension supervision 
systems are similarly grounded in the legal framework within which they operate which 
constitutes an environmental factor that is likely to be of similar importance (and closely 
related to) the overall level of economic development.  Figure 12 below divides the legal 
system for the countries considered between those that are based on systems of civil code 
and those derived primarily from English Common Law. 
 
Figure 12 Foundations of Legal Systems in the sampled countries:  
Common Law  Civil Code 
Australia Argentina 




A  comparison of the characteristics of supervisory practices outlined earlier with the 
type of legal system indicates that countries that share legal traditions based in English 
Common Law rely heavily on trustees and whistle blowers in the exercise of pension 
supervisory activities. These are entities that are external to the supervisory authority and 
subject to a regulatory framework that relies heavily on the application of  a prudent 
person standard. This process oriented standard that imposes responsibilities (and 
liability) on parties assigned specific duties in the management of pension funds is 
another potential factor that explains the low levels of intervention, the negotiated and 
corrective oriented nature of sanctions observed in these systems. Reliance on these 
parties for signals of non-compliance shifts much of the monitoring and analysis 
activities from the supervisor to private third parties. This is a possible explanation of the 
low levels of monitoring and analysis done in the house in countries where the legal 
system is based on English Common Law.  
The opposite is true for countries that base their legal systems on rule based civil codes 
(Argentina; Mexico; Chile) that are slower to adapt to changes in the economic and social 
environment. (Beck and Levine, 2004) pension systems based in civil code are those 
which typically have a more intensive and directive character and a punitive rather than 
compensatory approach to corrective actions and sanctions.    
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“Rule of law”, the extent to which formal legal systems are consistent and reliable, also 
potentially determines the extent to which supervisors are able to function in a more re-
active manner and to rely on markets and third parties to undertake some of the basic 
monitoring and analysis functions.  To test this hypothesis the sample of countries are 
compared to the relevant measure from a “Rule of Law” indicator developed by 
Kaufmann and Kraay (2003).  This indicator is derived from statistical compilation of 
various measures of the quality of legal systems and governance. Even though the 
countries relative positions displayed in Figure 16 on the “Rule of Law” indicator are not 
precise enough to sustain an exact country ranking, it does provide some insights to the 
connections between style and intensity of supervision.  
 
Figure 13 Rule of Law Index and Average Score of Intensity of Supervisory Activity 
 
 Source: Daniel Kaufmann; Aart Kraay; Massimo Mastruziz, “Governance Matters III: 
Governance Indicators for 1996-2002”, The World Bank, 2003.   
 
This indicates that higher levels of governance and rule of law are associated with 
supervisors that are less intense, directive and rely more on third party oversight and 
market mechanisms.  The capacity to pursue compliance issues through the courts in a 
reliable manner would enable supervisors to function in a more re-active and less 
intensive manner because they will have a greater capacity to achieve correction of 
problems after the fact and to make financial recoveries on behalf of the members of 
funds. This approach is buttressed by the ability to rely extensively on private rights of 
action to enforce compliance. High levels of governance and “rule of law” create 
opportunities for members of the pension funds to pursue their individual rights of action   
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in a negotiated process of litigation.  This can reduce the need to proactively enforce 
detailed protective mechanisms through intensive supervision activities.  
Number of Pension Funds. A key determinant of the capacity of a supervisor to engage 
in the pro-active methods is the number of entities they supervise.  Figure 14 shows the 
supervisory systems in relation to three groupings of the number of pension funds.  The 
largest, those with over 100,000 funds have responsibility for a number of entities that are 
many multiples of the number of staff employed by the supervisor. Some of these have 
more than 1,000 pension funds within their jurisdiction for each member of their staff.  
The middle grouping represents ratios of staffing to funds that are below ten. Those with 
a relatively small number of funds, less than 15, have more staff than funds within for 
which they are responsible. 
 
Figure 14 Primary Elements of Supervision and the Size of the Market for Privately Managed, 
Funded Retirement Systems.  
 
 
The analysis indicates that there is an association with the number of funds and the 
approach to supervision. Only the countries with a small number of funds engage in the 
more intensive methods, while those with a large number of funds indicate a pattern of 
less intensive interventions and greater reliance on communication activities. This seems 
to provide an explanation that reconciles some of the variations found in the comparison 
with the depth of financial markets. Hong Kong and Chile, for example, have more 
developed financial markets but a relatively small number of funds.  This seems to be   
41 
associated with a greater level of intensity of supervision than might be anticipated solely 
on the basis of the depth of their financial markets. 
Adding measures of financial market depth and the potential scope of responsibility of a 
pension supervisor provides some further insights into the factors that are associated with 
the variations in supervisory methods. These lend credence to the perception that 
countries with market-based, financially developed economies can rely on these markets 
to protect the rights of the pension plan members. Therefore they can afford to have a 
supervision style that is re-active, with low intensity intervention; exception-based 
analysis and remedial correction.  
Mandatory and Voluntary Systems.  The unifying concept for virtually all measures of 
supervision is the need to manage and limit risks.  One of the primary determinants of the 
capacity to bear risk is the whether a pension system is imposed on the population and 
represents the primary source of retirement income (resulting in a very low risk 
tolerance) or is a voluntary addition to the retirement savings of individuals who 
therefore may be willing to trade off risk for higher potential returns and flexibility.  A 
key design issue for voluntary pension systems are the level of direct and opportunity 
costs associated with very intensive and pro-active supervisory methods. Imposing high 
supervisory burdens may limit the willingness of employers and others to sponsor or 
manage pension funds. Funds managed on a collective basis in which assets and 
management are pooled may also be able to more effectively manage risk without the 
need for intensive supervision. Figure 15 below arrays the supervisory methods in three 
groups: voluntary occupational systems, mandatory occupational systems, and mandatory 
individual pension systems.   
42 
Figure 15 Type of Retirement Income Provision System: Mandatory versus Voluntary 
ThisThj
 
This indicates that there is a relationship between the intensity measure of the elements of 
supervision and the underlying nature of the pension system.  Occupational systems in the US, 
Australia and Ireland are generally less intensive in their approach while the mandatory systems 
of Latin America exhibit the opposite pattern. 
 
Conclusions 
A variety of observations and conclusions may be drawn from the description and 
analysis of these patterns of private pension supervision. At the most general level, there 
is considerable variation in the way that each of the primary elements of pension 
supervision is implemented. The individual systems, however, exhibit relatively 
consistent “styles” when their component elements are placed on a scale of relative 
intensity.  This supports the perception that there are a range of supervisory approaches 
that vary from the very intensive, pro-active and directive approach of Chile to the re-
active, exception based style of the United States.  More significantly, it illustrates that 
there is a continuum of styles that fall within this spectrum.  This suggests that rather than 
one or two normative models there are a variety of factors that influence and determine 
an appropriate method of supervision.  
Evaluating the relationships between possible explanatory factors and the patterns of the 
intensity of supervision, however, is more problematic.  The limited sample of countries 
examined and subjective nature of any scoring method limit observations to the   
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consideration of potential relationship rather than the development of determinative 
formulas.  Difficulties in assessing the pathways of possible causality accentuate the 
limitations of explanatory models as well.  It is very hard to differentiate between factors 
that may determine the organization and structure of the funded pension system from 
those that may influence the nature of the supervision applied to it. It is likely that various 
economic and legal environments simultaneously lend themselves to certain types of 
pension funds and strongly influence the type of supervision that is feasible or effective.  
For these reasons, while the observations about relationships between conditions and 
supervision provide useful insights into the process of matching form to function and 
aligning methods to the realities of prevailing conditions, their application to the design 
of supervisory techniques and institutions cannot be approached in a predictive or 
mechanistic fashion. 
Keeping in mind these important caveats, a number of useful observations about context 
and supervision can be derived from the analysis.  Increasing levels of per capita GDP 
and the depth of capital markets are negatively correlated with the intensity of 
supervisory practices. The first of these, a broad proxy for overall economic 
development, provides more of a reference point than explanatory power because of its 
linkage to all of the other potential influences examined. More developed countries 
nearly always have commensurate development of financial markets and legal institutions 
and are much more likely to be able to support voluntary pensions or rely on employers 
to manage occupational programs. The relationship to capital market development, 
however, provides some insights into the conditions required for supervisory systems to 
leverage various forms of other primary market oversight and formulate their activities as 
a form of tertiary supervision. This results in the focus on monitoring and exception only 
interventions observed in these settings.  It also enables supervisors to rely on private 
third party monitoring mechanisms such as auditors and actuaries. 
The legal environment exerts a similar influence on the supervisory methods.  Conditions 
in which there is a strong reliance on rule of law and the integrity of governance in public 
and private institutions create the capacity to relax licensing and other entry barriers and 
rely on indirect and less frequent forms of monitoring and intervention.  Conversely, 
environments characterized by lower respect for the rule of law require more intervention 
by public authorities.  An important factor in this process is likely to be the ability to rely 
on disclosure of information and private rights of action as a significant adjunct to 
compliance enforcement by public authorities. The capacity to utilize third parties and 
rely on private actions through a process of civil justice, perhaps even simply the 
presence and confidence in a commercial code of conduct and private adjudication is a 
likely common attribute to both the economic and legal factors at play in this process. 
Environmental factors exert similar influence on the structure of the pension system that 
also dictate the form and intensity of supervision.  Countries with mandatory individual 
systems are associated with very restrictive and intensive approaches to supervision.  Not 
coincidently, these same countries have systems with a very small number of funds. 
Countries with strong rule of law and governance have occupational arrangements with a 
large number of funds.  The ability to overcome the agency and moral hazard challenges 
required to sustain employer managed systems are directly linked to the ability to 
supervise these in a less pro-active manner.  No doubt the imperative to limit regulatory   
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burden and compliance costs in a voluntary system are key factors that strengthen this 
relationship. 
Taken together these factors suggest the relationship of context and supervision 
illustrated schematically below: 
 




This suggests that the conditions shown on the horizontal axis interact to influence the 
nature of the supervisory style observed in the different countries.  Countries with higher 
levels of per capita income and financial market development are associated with 
stronger rule of law, governance institutions, voluntary pension systems and occupational 
sponsorship.  These factors combine in a variety of ways that lead to supervisory systems 
that are more open, less pro-active and function in a less directive manner.  These factors 
both influence and reflect the underlying nature of the pension system. 
The degree to which these factors will enable supervisory systems to function in a less 
intensive manner however is broadly influenced by the underlying legal and cultural 
environment as is depicted by the parallel lines for two basic types of legal systems.  An   
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equivalent set of conditions in a civil law environment is likely to lead to more intensive 
style of supervision than might be present in the alternative. This is both because the 
common law system are associated with countries that have more developed capital 
markets and voluntary occupational systems but also because they are more conducive to 
flexible regulatory regimes, negotiated processes and perhaps most importantly the 
capacity to utilize third parties and private rights of action as compliance enforcement 
tools.  
This framework provides some useful observations about the general nature of these 
relationships and potentially enables policy makers to assess where they may reside along 
the range of certain characteristics of the environment that the supervisory system will 
function. There are, however, key limits to the applicability of these relationships that 
may shift significantly the position that a given country might otherwise be expected to 
occupy.  
One of the most important of these is the legal culture and tradition.  Countries that have 
adopted an Anglo axon common law may be far more conducive to more open and less 
directive systems than might otherwise be anticipated by the economic conditions.   
Conversely very highly developed countries with a civil code tradition may be 
constrained in their ability to adopt the more negotiated systems and reliance on private 
rights of actions that such a model would predict  
 In addition, such a model is relatively static and may provide more insights into the 
relevance of the initial conditions for a pension system than the dynamics of its evolution.  
At this point the experience with the way in which supervisory systems evolve with the 
conditions around them is far too limited to offer any assessment about whether countries 
will maintain these relationships as their economies and pension systems develop. 
The evaluation of these relationships does provide a useful framework, some relevant 
points of reference, and valuable insights into the importance of prevailing conditions on 
the design and implementation of private pension supervision.  It illuminates the extent to 
which the intensity and form of supervisory activities are a function of the matching of 
methods to environment, directing attention to this matching process rather than the 
formulation of normative models in the development of guidelines for best practices. By 
doing so, it provides a useful starting point for the introduction of new systems in the 
continuing reform process and some guideposts for existing supervisors to consider their 
future course.   
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